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DELEGATIONS TO CONFERENCES OF THE PARTIES  
Dr Edward J. Goodwin
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Abstract 
This paper concerns the likelihood that decisions adopted at plenary meetings of the parties to 
multilateral environmental agreements will influence the behaviour of States Parties. Relying upon a 
theory emphasising the importance of rational persuasion of decisions and the legitimacy of 
decision-making processes, the paper explains how choices concerning the preparation of delegates 
and then participation of delegations at plenary meetings of the parties to environmental treaties 
might enhance the likelihood of those decisions having a positive effect upon the actions of States 
Parties. This is done using a case study of the UK delegation to a recent meeting of the parties to the 
1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance. That case study also provides 
examples of potentially positive modalities adopted by the UK, whilst also revealing suspected 
concerns for the future surrounding retention of experienced delegates and the impact of Brexit. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper argues that the rules, customs, and tactics shaping the way a given State selects 
and prepares delegates to represent it at conferences of the parties (COPs) to multi-lateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs), and how that delegation then participates in these plenary 
meetings, has the potential to impact upon the likelihood of the decisions collectively agreed 
at COPs being followed by that State Party. The decisions adopted at COPs are significant for 
the efficient and effective operation of many environmental conservation treaties, as well as 
development of obligations.
1
 Thus, the paper is not so much concerned with compliance with 
treaty obligations, but rather the influence of the non-binding decisions that are crucial to 
delivering the objectives of a conservation regime.  
The sets of rules, customs and tactics that operate around and within delegations are 
encapsulated in the term ‘internal modalities’. ‘Internal modalities’ are a neglected dimension 
in international environmental law studies. Certainly, there has been no attempt theoretically 
to link these modalities with decision influence. Imagining certain State practice and holding 
this up against a framework for decision influence could suffice as an attempt at such. 
However, since producing grounded accounts of State internal modalities to MEAs has also 
been neglected, and little effort has been made to design a suitable process for capturing such 
data, this paper looks to increase its relevance and contribution by offering a grounded and 
robust account of one State’s internal modalities for attending a COP.  
The grounded findings come from a case study into the UK’s internal modalities for their 
delegation to COP11 of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
                                                            
*
 Associate Professor in Law, School of Law, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. Email: 
edward.goodwin@nottingham.ac.uk. The author wishes to thank Hemi Mistry, Michael Bowman, Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, and Marko Milanovic for comments they provided on earlier drafts. The author alone remains 
responsible for any errors or omissions the paper may contain.  
1
 For further discussion on obligation development see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Law-Making and International 
Environmental Law: The Legal Character of Decisions of the Conference of the Parties’ in Rain Liivoja and 
Jarna Petman (eds), International Law-Making: Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers  (Routledge 2014) 190, 193-
196 
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especially as Waterfowl Habitat (‘Ramsar’).
2
 The paper will first introduce Ramsar, 
explaining how the regime (like so many wildlife treaties) relies heavily upon the decisions it 
adopts at COPs for its effective operation. Ramsar thus relies upon States acting in a manner 
consistent with these decisions, rendering it important to consider what draws States towards 
acting in conformity with them. Next, the paper offers a theoretical framework explaining the 
characteristics and conditions of decisions and decision-making that increase the 
persuasiveness of decisions. The framework is then applied to the UK’s internal modalities. 
This highlights the practices that might have increased the persuasiveness of the decisions 
taken at the COP in question.  
The outcome of this analysis replaces a number of intuitive beliefs about best practice for 
internal modalities (largely concerning delegate experience and appropriate consultation) 
with evidence and concrete examples from a case study. New observations are also offered, 
such as how the UK may soon struggle (as developing States do) to retain institutional 
knowledge and experience. Further, there may be unique challenges created by the UK 
leaving the European Union. These insights gain extra importance in a context of the theory 
of persuasiveness of decisions. This then lends weight to investing in best practice concerning 
internal modalities for delegations, such as action on training and delegate succession 
planning, as well as for securing accessible and transparent consultation. The intended result 
is greater influence of decisions that are the mainstay operational tool for MEA regimes like 
Ramsar. 
 
2. The Ramsar Convention 
Wetlands provide valuable ecosystem services including fertile habitat for biodiversity, flood 
control, water purification, and carbon storage. Nevertheless, their continued provision has 
long been threatened by, inter alia, drainage in response to public health concerns, 
agricultural or urban development, and inappropriate water management.
3
 To combat this, the 
Ramsar Convention was adopted in the Iranian coastal resort of that name on 2 February 
1971.  In 1976 the Convention entered into force in the UK, and at the time of writing in 
2018, 169 States were contracting parties.
4
 
Ramsar’s jurisdiction captures wetlands within the territories of contracting parties. Wetlands 
are defined in Article 1(1) as: 
areas of marsh, fen, peatland or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or 
temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas 
of marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six metres. 
This incorporates an extensive range of natural and manmade wetland habitats, and their 
associated ecosystems, including coastal and inland wetlands. 
Significant to Ramsar is its employment of an inventory as part of its conservation strategy. 
Thus, wetlands falling within Article 1(1) may go on to be inscribed on the Ramsar List of 
Wetlands of International Importance (the “List”). Consequently, Article 2 calls for States 
Parties to enter wetlands within its territory on the List provided they are significant in 
ecological, botanical, zoological, hydrological or limnological terms.
5
 
                                                            
2 2 February 1971, 996 UNTS 245 
3
 Michael Bowman, ‘The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands: Has it Made a Difference’ (2002) Yearbook of 
International Co-operation on Environment and Development 61, 61 
4
 For details, see <http://www.ramsar.org/country-profiles> accessed 4 March 2018 
5 Ramsar Article 2(2) 
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2.1 Substantive Obligations 
Ramsar then provides for obligations applicable to all wetlands, with additional commitments 
applying to the sub-category of listed wetlands. The main obligation for all wetlands is that 
States Parties ‘shall formulate and implement their planning so as to promote… as far as 
possible the wise use of wetlands in their territory’.
6
 “Wise use” was not defined in any 
greater detail in the treaty and thus the COP intervened by issuing a decision that stated that 
wise use of wetlands is taken to mean ‘the maintenance of their ecological character, 
achieved through the implementation of ecosystem approaches, within the context of 
sustainable development.’
7
 Additional obligations supporting wise use are listed in Article 4 
such as to promote conservation by establishing nature reserves with adequate wardening, 
and to promote the training of personnel competent in the fields of wetland research and 
management. 
In relation to the extra obligations attaching to listed wetlands, the principal obligation is that 
States Parties ‘shall formulate and implement their planning so as to promote the 
conservation of wetlands included in the List’.
8
 Whilst the standard of “conservation” has 
come to be assimilated with wise use,
9
 again through decisions adopted by the COP to 
supplement the treaty text, it should be noted that the wise use of wetlands generally is 
qualified in Article 3 by the words ‘as far as possible’, unlike the obligation to conserve listed 
sites.  
The treaty further obliges States Parties to undertake a degree of additional investment in 
environmental monitoring. Under Article 3(2), contracting parties must institute mechanisms 
to facilitate detection of adverse changes in the ecological character of listed wetlands caused 
by technological developments, pollution or other human interference. Ramsar then obliges 
States to inform the Convention Secretariat of any such change.
10
 A formal list of sites 
undergoing such change, known as the ‘Montreux Record’, is maintained.
11
  
The remaining substantive obligations relate to State cooperation. For example, Parties are 
encouraged to exchange data, and research on wetlands and their flora and fauna.
12
 Further, 
under Article 5 they shall consult each other generally with respect to implementing their 
obligations, especially when dealing with transboundary wetlands and shared water systems.  
2.2 Implications for the COP and this Study 
The key point to take away from the above is that the substantive provisions of Ramsar are 
established in just four articles, comprising 14 clauses. The remaining nine articles contain 
definitions, establish the COP, other administrative provisions, rules for entry into force, and 
withdrawal and depository arrangements. Ramsar is, therefore, one of the pithier treaties 
adopted within international environmental law. Consequently, and given the time-
consuming and difficult nature of amending treaties,
13
 it has fallen to the COP to guide and 
develop State practice  
Given its crucial role in supplementing the few provisions of the treaty, it is worth putting the 
Ramsar COP in some context. In previous research the author has recounted how COPs to 
                                                            
6 Ramsar Article 3(1) 
7
 Resolution IX.1, Annex A, [22] 
8
 Ramsar Article 3(1) 
9
 Michael Bowman, Peter Davies and Catherine Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2
nd
 edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2010) 414-419 (hereafter “Lyster”) 
10
 Article 3(2) 
11
 Recommendation 4.8 
12
 Ramsar Article 4(3) 
13 In fact it was not until 1982 that a protocol was adopted to enable amendment of the treaty. 
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MEAs were introduced and designed to provide flexibility and to overcome the failings of 
diplomatic conferences and Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs).
14
 COPs enabled 
regular meetings of the contracting parties thereby preventing initiatives from stalling or 
being ignored.
15
 Furthermore, environmental knowledge is continually evolving, even after 
an MEA has been concluded. Best practice can change, as can the conservation status of 
species. Environmental problems, therefore, demand regimes that are sufficiently malleable 
to respond to subsequent and rapid developments, and COPs meet this need far better than 
IGOs and diplomatic conferences.
16
  
Ramsar was one of the first environmental treaties to provide for a COP, which are now held 
triennially. Further, from the outset, the COP has been supported by the IUCN-based Ramsar 
Bureau, which acts as the Secretariat.
17
 The ‘Introduction’ to this paper detailed one type of 
work often undertaken by COPs, namely that of obligation development. To this can be 
added (i) systems management, (ii) strategic planning, and (iii) reviewing compliance and 
progress.
18
 The COPs held under Ramsar are today competent to address multiple issues 
falling within all of these categories. The COP can commission and publish documents 
adding detail to the substance of treaty provisions; develop the rules of procedure for listing 
wetlands of importance; and, monitor the state of wetlands. For example, the regime has 
provided further elaboration on core commitments (like wise use) through the issuance and 
regular updating of guidelines and handbooks designed to help implementation.
19
 Indeed, the 
Guidelines for the Implementation of the Wise Use Concept observe it ‘is desirable, in the 
long term, that all Contracting Parties should have comprehensive national wetland policies, 
formulated in whatever manner is appropriate to their national institutions.’
20
 Such National 
Wetland Policies are vital to attaining wise use, since raising awareness, co-ordination and 
planning on a national scale are vital elements to achieving this end. The guidelines also draw 
particular attention, inter alia, to impact assessment of projects upon wetlands, and the 
involvement of stakeholders and local people in formulating policies.
21
 This provides far 
more detail than the Convention text, and provides benchmarks that can be monitored via 
strategically drafted reporting forms that are submitted before every COP.  
The work slated for COP11 (which is the subject of the empirical research undertaken for this 
study) included resolutions on the modus operandi, delivery of advice and support, and 
priorities of the scientific advisory panel.
22
 Other administrative issues concerned budget 
reports and the hosting of the Secretariat.
23
 Some agenda items related to formal 
                                                            
14
 Edward Goodwin, ‘Delegate Preparation and Participation in Conferences of the Parties to Environmental 
Treaties’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Duncan French (eds), International Environmental Law and Governance 
(BRILL | Nijhoff 2015) 51, 60 
15
 Simon Lyster famously called agreements that do not hold such sessions ‘sleeping treaties’; Lyster (n 9) 533 
16
 See further Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 American Journal of 
International Law 623, 628 
17
 Article 8(1) and Resolution IX.10 
18
 For greater detail on each category, see Goodwin (n 14) 62-64; see also Louise Camenzuli, ‘The Development 
of International Environmental Law at the Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ Conference of the Parties 
and its Validity’ (2007), available <http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/cel10_camenzuli.pdf> accessed 4 March 
2018 
19
 The numerous guides and 21 handbooks can be accessed via <http://www.ramsar.org/library> accessed 4 
March 2018 
20
 As adopted under Recommendation 4.10 (Annex), 6, and supplemented by Resolution 5.6 (Introduction) 
21
 Id. 
22
 Ramsar DR XI/16-18 
23 Ramsar DR XI/1-2 
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pronouncements on the conservation status of particular wetlands.
24
 The majority, however, 
had the potential to impact upon expectations of contracting parties such as the form and 
content of the Ramsar Information Sheet that needs to be produced for all listed wetlands,
25
 
the implications of climate change on Ramsar,
26
 and a series of principles for the planning 
and management of urban and peri-urban wetlands.
27
 Of course, not all such resolutions were 
relevant to the UK.
28
 
Whilst the range of activities of the COP is well known, the legal status of COP outputs is 
rather more complex and consequently an extensive body of academic literature has been 
published.
29
 The position seemingly varies according to the type of action being undertaken 
and whether it can be considered ‘law-making’, such as whether the COP is: acting as a 
forum for the formal amendment of the MEA;
30
 providing clarification pursuant to an 
enabling clause;
31
 or providing interpretive functions not pursued under enabling clauses but 
which Davies has rightly argued can amount to subsequent agreement or practice reflecting 
the parties interpretation of a treaty under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.
32
 These are interesting issues and much remains unresolved. Ultimately, however, 
this paper does not turn upon the status of the decisions taken at COP11, or MEAs in general, 
since the influence of the decisions upon a State party is its primary concern and the approach 
adopted accommodates the different possibilities concerning legal status. 
In summary, the Convention text, like so many other environmental treaties (particularly 
those connected to conservation of biological diversity), is just the tip of the iceberg. Below 
the surface of the hard laws accepted in the treaty lies a large body of material adopted by the 
parties through decisions taken at the COP. It is crucial that these decisions have an influence 
upon State behaviour since those resolutions and recommendations specify conduct that 
should achieve the regime’s objectives.  
 
3. The Study’s Framework on Decision Influence 
Having given some international law context for the research, the methods and theoretical 
framework for this paper can now be established. 
3.1 Internal Modalities and Methods 
Internal modalities are common within groups, from sports teams to law firms. They are also 
tailored towards collective goals. Such goals can vary, for example winning a competition, or 
                                                            
24
 Ramsar DR XI/4 
25 Ramsar DR XI/8 
26
 Ramsar DR XI/14 
27
 Ramsar DR XI/11 
28
 For example, those on pesticide usage in rice paddies; Ramsar DR XI/15 
29 See for example, Churchill and Ulfstein (n 16), Jutta Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 1; Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, ‘Consent to be Bound – Anything New Under the Sun?’ (2005) 74 Nordic Journal of International 
Law 483; Camenzuli (n 18); Annecoos Wiersma ‘The New International Law Makers? Conferences of the 
Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements” (2009) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 231; 
Fitzmaurice (n 1) 
30
 Since such changes require subsequent ratification by the parties it is difficult to view the COP as more than a 
forum for negotiations rather than as making binding law at such moments (although the MARPOL 73/76 
convention may provide an exception to this), see further Fitzmaurice (n 1) 193-195 
31
 Such work may be closer to law-making and thus deserve greater caution; id., 196 
32
 Peter Davies, ‘Non-Compliance: A Pivotal or Secondary Function of COP Governance?’ in Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice and Duncan French (eds), International Environmental Law and Governance (BRILL | Nijhoff 
2015) 87, 95-96 
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securing the services of the best graduating law students in a year. At the same time, other 
groups in the same sphere of life are implementing their own internal modalities. At some 
point (such as during a match, or during a recruitment round) these modalities become 
entwined and affect each other, ultimately producing a result. Whilst internal modalities are 
adjustable, there will often be external rules that shape these practices. For example, law 
societies regulate the legal profession, whilst various governing bodies order professional 
sports.  
The internal modalities of delegations to COPs behave in a similar way and setting. 
Delegations will have their own internal modalities governing how they prepare for meetings 
and how they will participate in the work of a session. These will be set according to their 
objectives and these modalities will ultimately become entwined with those of other States 
during COPs. What is more, autonomy to determine the nature of that internal modality is 
constrained to the extent that international law, the treaty establishing the COP and rules of 
procedure must be respected and followed. A significant task in this research was to gain as 
much detail on the UK’s internal modalities for COP11, as well as the external rules that 
constrained the UK’s freedom to design these modalities. This called for mixed methods 
research. 
The first method involved extensive desk-based reviews. The significant volume of material 
concerning the endeavours of the parties to MEAs suggests this ought to reveal a lot about the 
internal modalities of delegations. Further, the amount of material increases again if 
recognition is given to the fact that evidence relating to delegates and delegations to treaty 
negotiations in other realms of public international law and intergovernmental organisations 
is included. Use of such material is appropriate given the purposive and practical similarities 
in the operational remits of COPs, negotiating conferences, and intergovernmental 
organisations.
33
 Nevertheless, the reality is that insights into internal modalities are 
incomplete if limited to this material.  This encourages deployment of alternative methods to 
generate wider reference points on modalities. 
Therefore, the second method employed was semi-structured elite interviews with those who 
were closest to designing and operating the UK’s internal modalities.
34
 Given the unexplored 
nature of the area, an overly rigid structure for interviews was avoided, with preference given 
to a loose agenda around pre-defined themes shaped by insights from the desk-based 
enquiry.
35
 This ensured flexibility to explore issues in greater depth and to test hypotheses, 
even as they arose.
36
  
Interviewees were identified primarily via chain-referral to other important actors in the UK 
delegation and, due to mentions of UK NGOs in interviews, a decision was made to approach 
appropriate individuals in these organisations. Many had attended COP11. This offered 
counter-points to some of the delegates’ opinions. The study therefore relied upon and 
benefited from purposive, rather than random, sampling. 
Significantly, this means that the case study captured data for the complete population of the 
UK delegation, plus a number of other NGO connected actors. The result is original and rich 
data, which combined with the extensive desk-based research, provides a detailed, reliable, 
                                                            
33 Goodwin (n 14) 58-61 
34
 For a guide to such interviews, see LA Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (ECPR 2006) 
35
 There were broadly three themes to the questions: delegate selection, preparation and participation.  
36
 Beth Leech, ‘Asking Questions: Techniques for Semi-Structured Interviews’ (2002) 45(4) Political Science 
and Politics 665, 665 
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and grounded case study. From this an analysis revealing the possible persuasiveness of the 
decisions adopted can be built using the following theoretical framework for decision 
influence. 
3.2 A Theory of Decision Influence 
Within a context of diminished enforcement capabilities, international environmental lawyers 
have long been interested in how to design and manage MEAs so as to otherwise influence 
State behaviour. Much of this has concerned achieving compliance with MEAs, which 
requires reaching a position of fulfilling treaty obligations. Various theories have been 
proposed concerning why States comply with such obligations, with Fitzmaurice highlighting 
six, including Chayes and Handler Chayes’ managerial theory, Brunnée and Toope’s 
interactional theory, and Franck’s theory of legitimacy.
37
 Seemingly, as Fitzmaurice states, 
the ‘theory which in the most apposite manner explains the compliance by States with a rule 
of international law – in this case the decision of COPs – is a matter of a personal choice.’
38
 
Whilst some of these will be woven into the theoretical account that follows, two others 
demand inclusion, not least because they tackle the wider notion of influencing behaviour, 
rather than the narrower concept of fulfilling treaty obligations.
39
 It is a theory built from the 
last of these that is this author’s chosen framework for analysing the data collected. 
First, Mitchell suggests that environmental agreements influence behaviour through a ‘logic 
of consequences’ and a ‘logic of appropriateness’.
40
 The former regards States as rational 
actors, behaving according to calculations as to what is in their best interests.
41
 Indeed, it is 
worth noting that in Chayes and Handler Chayes’ managerial theory of compliance they too 
accept that self-interest enters into most if not all behaviour that deviates from directions.
42
 
The ‘logic of appropriateness’ reflects the idea that States may regard themselves in a 
particular light and wish to be perceived in that way by other States, such as being ‘green’ or 
‘law abiding’. Thus MEAs signal how particular conduct will be regarded.
43
  
Second, the work of Bodansky more than deserves inclusion in any research into decision 
influence. Bodansky has conducted a detailed assessment, synthesis, and mapping of the 
extensive literature in the field from the 20 years before he was writing, and from which he 
has extracted three common bases of influence upon States. These can act in combination or 
alone, and are power, rational persuasion and legitimacy.
44
 For example, a decision might be 
                                                            
37
 Fitzmaurice (n 1) 208-210 
38 Id., 210 
39
 Focusing solely upon compliance with an obligation ignores other positive achievements of a regime such as 
catalysing progress within a State that has taken it meaningfully towards (albeit just short of) meeting an 
obligation, and it presupposes that compliance with a hard law obligation will be effective in reversing an 
environmental threat. A focus upon influence allows for the former, whilst decisions issued by COPs are 
commonly about promoting best practice against an environmental problem. Nevertheless, since these 
compliance theories include the reasons why States act in a particular way, they remain relevant, as indeed 
appears to be Fitzmaurice’s assumption when citing them to explain compliance with COP decisions; id.  
40 Ronald Mitchell, ‘Compliance Theory’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP, 2007) 893, 901  
41
 Id., 901-902 
42
 Abram Chayes, ‘Compliance without Enforcement’ (1997) 91 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 53, 55 
43
 Mitchell (n 40) 902-903 
44
 Daniel Bodansky, ‘Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations’ in Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark 
Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the 
Art (CUP 2013) 321, 326 
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followed because of a third party exerting power or force.
45
 This might include threats of 
trade sanctions, or measures imposed by COPs as part of compliance procedures.
46
 
Presumably, Mitchell would agree and link such power to a profound effect upon a State’s 
logic of consequences. Crucially for the purposes of this research, that type of force comes 
after the production of a decision at a COP. Given that this study is concerned with the 
internal modalities for delegate preparation and participation for the COP, its focus is upon 
events prior to the adoption of a decision. This paper will not, therefore, offer insights into 
post-plenary pressure. However, the position is different with regard to rational persuasion 
and legitimacy, and it is these two theoretical bases that underpin the analysis of the data 
acquired in this research. 
3.2.1 Rational persuasion 
With respect to rational persuasion, the suggestion is that if the actor regards a direction as 
convincing in some way, this can lead to particular behaviour. This may be because it is 
interpreted as being in the interest of a State or the individual whose acts count as those of the 
State.
47
 Also, a decision may be rationally persuasive for other reasons; maybe it is 
convincing according to science, the merits of a well-reasoned judgment, or a sense of 
justice.
48
 Here connections can be proposed to Mitchell’s logic of consequence. For example, 
the science convinces a State as to the likelihood of an undesirable result. They can also be 
proposed to the logic of appropriateness. A State may regard itself as being law abiding and 
thus a law-making decision pursuant to an enabling clause, or convincing judicial reasoning 
as to the rightful position of the law, will direct the State accordingly.  
From a practical perspective, if a COP decision is to be rationally persuasive, logically this 
appears dependent upon three crucial stages. First, identifying key actors who need to be 
rationally persuaded. Second, identifying the various grounds upon which a proposal might 
then be viewed as rationally determined by those actors. Finally, having identified which 
grounds are likely to rationally persuade key actors, ensuring that the decision issued by the 
COP reflects them effectively. The analysis of the UK’s internal modalities in the following 
sections will highlight how each of these stages of rational persuasion played out in the 
course of the process of negotiating and adopting decisions, from the perspective of the UK 
delegation. It will further offer best practice recommendations for how to bolster the rational 
persuasiveness of a decision at each of these three stages, with a view to thereby enhancing 
the likelihood that the decision adopted will influence the behaviour of the UK, in line with 
the overall objectives of the treaty. 
3.2.2 Legitimacy 
Even in the absence of power, and if an individual is not rationally persuaded by a decision, it 
is claimed they may still follow a decision because of the perceived legitimacy of the 
international regime’s authority over them.
49
 Legitimacy is understood and used in many 
different ways by different people, but the data capture method as designed in this research 
was best placed to focus upon normative legitimacy.
50
 This form of legitimacy concerns the 
                                                            
45 Daniel Bodansky, ‘Legitimacy’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP 2007) 706, 707 
46
 Id., 707 
47
 Vaughan Lowe, International Law (OUP 2007) 19-21 
48 Bodansky (n 44) 
49
 Bodansky (n 45) 707-8 
50
 Bodansky (n 44) 322. Descriptive legitimacy is an alternative form, however few academics have engaged in 
the empirical research needed to consider it, Tom Tyler being a notable exception; see Tom Tyler, Why People 
Obey the Law (Princeton 2006) 
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extent to which a regime conforms to normative standards against which it is judged. It is 
about the qualities of the ruler.
51
 
Normative legitimacy can relate to the legal system itself. For instance, regarding standards 
of legitimacy for a legal system, under Brunnée and Toope’s interactional theory,
52
 law’s 
value lies in the sense of obligation it generates.
53
 That obligation is generated where States 
and actors perceive law making to be legitimate.
54
 In their theory, legitimacy flows from 
three factors:
55
 (i) shared understandings of the role of law and particular norms; (ii) 
adherence of the norm to criteria of legality, such as the fact that a norm must not demand the 
impossible;
56
 and (iii) reinforcement of the norm through a continuing practice of legality.  
Research into the internal modalities of delegates to COPs could be used to explore the 
possible normative legitimacy of decisions since COPs play a key role in nurturing 
obligation, as the forum for building a community of practice, and sustaining shared 
understanding and interaction within it.
57
 For example, the community of practice operating 
under an MEA thrives through nourishment from others participating at the national and 
international levels.
58
 This means preparation that facilitates communication and interaction 
with these communities ought to be valuable. Preparation might also establish that which is 
practicable and consistent with national and international commitments already undertaken 
by a state, thereby delivering on elements of legality. However, with so many different ways 
of approaching legitimacy, and only so much space available, this paper leaves to a later date 
using the interactional theory as a framework for the analysis of the data relating to the 
legitimacy component of persuasion. Instead, the paper will adopt what Bodansky assessed to 
be the more prevalent conception, namely the legitimacy of the regime bodies that issue 
directions.
59
 The links to this in the data obtained are more readily apparent. 
Political scientists assessing the normative legitimacy of a governing body (as opposed to the 
legal system), draw a distinction between input legitimacy (standards surrounding the process 
of issuing directions) and output legitimacy (referring to the results of issuing directions).
60
 
For output legitimacy, the results ought to be effective and/or equitable. As Daniel Esty 
observes, and utilising the work of Max Weber, ‘[A] demonstrated capacity to deliver good 
outcomes has been the main attraction to nation-states of delegating elements of 
policymaking to supranational bodies’.
61
 This requires a well of expertise from which to 
draw, and the production of rational analysis leading to good outcomes.
62
  
                                                            
51
 Bodansky, id., 327 
52
 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legality and Legitimacy in International Law (CUP 2010). Thomas Franck 
was similarly interested in theories of legal obligation and he sought an understanding of the formal 
characteristics of norms that result in ‘compliance pull’; see Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among 
Nations (OUP 1990) 
53
 Brunnée and Toope, id., 55 
54 Id. 
55
 Id., 53-54 
56
 Id., 26. The eight criteria of legality are taken from Lon Fuller’s theory concerning the internal morality of 
law, namely: (i) generality, (ii) promulgation, (iii) prospective effect, (iv) clarity, (v) consistency, (vi) realistic 
demands, (vii) stability, and (viii) congruency between the rules as promulgated and as administered; Lon 
Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 39 
57
 Brunnée and Toope, id., 356 
58
 Id., Chapter 2 
59 Bodansky (n 44) 324 
60
 Id., 329-332 
61
 Daniel Esty, ‘Good Governance at the Supernational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law’ (2006) 115 Yale 
Law Journal 1490, 1517 
62 Id. 
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The aspects that drive input legitimacy are numerous. Democracy is widely regarded as a 
cornerstone for maintaining the legitimate exercise of authority by those governing at the 
national level, such as the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), which is a crucial body within this study. However, the ‘democratic deficit’ within 
international governance means it is impracticable to have accountability via elections, and 
thus achieve this in full at the international level.
63
 Instead, Esty argues that the focus needs 
to be upon other features of democracies, and thus ‘quasi-democratic legitimacy can be 
established through mechanisms that force supranational authorities to be more attentive to 
their representativeness and accountable to the public(s) they serve’.
64
 This links to some of 
the other factors that drive input legitimacy. For instance, it requires: the international body to 
operate according to (stable) rules and traditions; ideally having ‘check’s and balances’ 
designed into the regime structure akin to the separation of powers within nation States; a 
transparent decision-making process offering chances for debate and dialogue between those 
stakeholders representing a range of views; and adherence to procedures that demand that the 
authority, inter alia, is transparent in its operation, and offers opportunities to review their 
actions.
65
 As will be claimed, both many of the factors comprising input legitimacy and 
output legitimacy could be enhanced through the adoption of certain practices for delegation 
preparation and participation.  
 
4. The UK’s Internal Modalities for COP11 
It is proposed that if the contracting parties to Ramsar were able at COP11 to issue decisions 
that are regarded by their target audience as rationally persuasive, and/or in a context where 
crucial authorities are considered as acting legitimately (using the components of input and 
output normative legitimacy), then this ought to have an impact upon the likelihood of these 
decisions influencing State action. In what ways might the internal modalities adopted by the 
UK therefore secure such rational persuasion and legitimacy?  
In order to answer this, data on the UK’s internal modalities was acquired using the 
aforementioned mixed methods. The data are presented in this section under the following 
internal modality themes: (1) populating delegations; (2) pre-COP preparation; and (3) 
delegation participation. Each section begins with a review of the published evidence before 
overlaying the findings of the empirical research.  
4.1 Populating Delegations 
When the UK exercised its right to send a delegation to Ramsar COP11, it needed to select 
individuals to act as delegates on its behalf. This entailed both a decision concerning personal 
attributes, and about the number of people who should be sent. The internal modalities 
deployed in this context are constrained and shaped to a small degree by forces external to the 
UK government, for example treaty provisions.  
4.1.1 Desk-based findings 
Ramsar does not place any restrictions upon the number of delegates a party, such as the UK, 
can select to attend as its representatives. The Rules of Procedure merely indicate that 
                                                            
63
 Id., 1507-1508; Bodansky (n 44) 329-330 
64
 Esty (n 61) 1516 
65
 Esty describes these as order-based, systemic, procedural and deliberative legitimacy; id., 1520; and see also, 
for wider recognition of these elements, Bodansky (n 44) 329-331 
Page 10 of 26
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jel
Manuscripts submitted to Journal of Environmental Law
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
11 
 
someone needs to be designated as the head of the delegation,
66
 and that all representatives 
and advisors should carry the required credentials from their State.
67
 Past practice of the UK 
is revealed in the records of participants and is set out in Diagram 1.
68
 This indicates that, 
whilst not sending some of the largest delegations to the plenary meetings,
69
 generally the 
UK opts to send an above-average-sized group, such as the four delegates sent to COP11. 
A second dimension worthy of consideration is expertise and previous experience of 
attending COPs. The Ramsar Convention is unusual amongst MEAs
70
 in that Article 7(1) of 
the treaty states that representatives selected to attend on behalf of contracting parties ‘should 
include persons who are experts on wetlands or waterfowl’. This expertise could come from 
scientific, administrative or other relevant knowledge or experience.
71
 That said, the 
constraints Article 7(1) imposes on modalities are weak; entreating States rather than obliging 
them to appoint such delegates, and leaving open-ended the precise level of knowledge or 
experience regarded as appropriate to satisfy the request. Furthermore, the attendance records 
for Ramsar COPs are unreliable indicators of individual expertise or knowledge.  
The only measurable using attendance records is whether a delegate has had previous 
experience of representing a State at an earlier COP. Thus, where the UK had the option of 
sending someone who had previously attended a Ramsar COP, it did so on all but one 
occasion, as reflected in Diagram 1.
72
 Indeed, for COP11, three of the four delegates had this 
type of experience. 
Diagram 1 – Size and Experience of UK Delegations to Ramsar COPs 1980-2015
73
 
[Insert Diagram] 
Of course, research of this sort based upon UK attendance records reveals little about the 
effects of numerical strength, substantive expertise or forensic experience upon UK 
                                                            
66 Ramsar Rules of Procedure (2015), Rule 16, available at <http://www.ramsar.org/document/ramsar-rules-of-
procedure-cop12> accessed 4 March 2018. 
67
 Id., Rule 18. For discussion of the nature of credentials compared to full powers see Goodwin (n 14) 68-73 
68
 For information on the sizes of delegations for all Ramsar contracting parties up to COP11, see Goodwin, id., 
76-78. 
69
 For example, States such as China, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and the USA have, in the past, sent 
delegations of 10 or more delegates, even if they are not hosting the COP. 
70
 For further examples, see Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151, Article 9(3). Non-environmental examples include the Convention of the 
World Meteorological Organization, 11 October 1947, 77 UNTS 143, Article 7(b) and the Constitution of the 
International Labour Organization, Article 3(1) available at 
<http://ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO> accessed 4 March 
2018. 
71
 Ramsar, Article 7(1). The World Heritage Convention, which contains a similar clause (n 70), was, like 
Ramsar, negotiated with the involvement of IUCN. Many of the remaining leading MEAs have been negotiated 
with the support of UNEP. The inclusion and exclusion of such provisions may therefore be linked to the 
documentary precedents used as starting points for negotiations; see Churchill and Ulfstein (n 16) 630 
72
 For information on the sizes of delegations for all Ramsar contracting parties, see Goodwin (n 14) 78-79. 
73
 The host nation is excluded from average calculations since the records reveal exceptional numbers of 
delegates that are out of the ordinary for the host State’s usual practice, thus skewing the average; for greater 
detail see Goodwin id., 77 
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negotiations and engagement with COPs.
74
 This was, therefore, something factored into the 
design of the semi-structured interviews. 
4.1.2 Findings from the interviews 
DEFRA manages the UK’s internal modality for preparation and participation in Ramsar 
COPs. Desk-based research had already revealed that DEFRA elected to send four delegates 
to COP11 to represent the UK, three had experience of previous Ramsar plenary meetings, 
and one of the three had attended all of the preceding five COPs dating back to 1996. The 
interviews supplemented this, revealing that the fourth delegate had extensive horizontal 
experience of COPs under the treaty regimes governing climate change, trade in endangered 
species, and migratory species regimes.  
Interestingly, the interviews also revealed that this experienced delegation was put together at 
a late stage due to individuals originally selected (who had direct responsibility for Ramsar 
within DEFRA) suddenly being unable to attend. Nevertheless, the replacement identified at 
short notice to act as Head of Delegation had played the same role 13 years before at Ramsar 
COP7 and in the meantime had been closely involved with the UK’s Sites of Special 
Scientific Interest. The latter is the principal UK regulatory vehicle for implementing Ramsar. 
A different last minute substitute had also been the policy coordinator for the previous year’s 
COP in South Korea, as well as the lead for national implementation of Ramsar commitments 
concerning designated sites. Retention of these staff members within DEFRA afforded the 
UK an effective, reflexive, response to the situation. 
Interview responses about the UK’s approach to selecting the number and required expertise 
of delegates, revealed two things. First, the COP agenda influences the selection process. 
This means identifying the items that are of greatest interest to the UK and the likely number 
of relevant working groups, and then ensuring that the appropriate people attend to engage in 
negotiations on those items. Second, DEFRA’s internal modality seeks delegates who can 
assess proceedings from at least a policy point of view, as well as from an ecological and 
ornithological perspective. In addition, sometimes legal input is needed. For instance, given 
the scheduled discussions at COP11 concerning the institutional hosting arrangements for the 
Ramsar secretariat, the legal department within DEFRA recommended the inclusion of an 
international biodiversity lawyer.  
One interviewee noted that they were fortunate to be representing a State that was able to 
field such a multidisciplinary team. Another observed that, even though the article described 
‘a “should” not a “shall”’, the delegation that was sent left little doubt about the UK 
satisfying Article 7(1)’s call for the inclusion of an expert on wetlands or waterfowl.  
Turning to further issues just concerning delegate experience, UK delegation interviewees 
affirmed the huge importance of this for the quality of engagement. One opinion expressed 
was that inexperience because of high turnover of personnel affected a State’s effective 
representation, and the regime’s efficiency and capacity to produce a consistent body of work 
                                                            
74
 Indirectly relevant insights can be extracted from the literature about non-environmental treaty regimes and 
negotiations, such as the UN General Assembly or trade negotiations; see for example John Hadwin and Johan 
Kaufmann, How United Nations Decisions are Made (Sythoff 1960) 28-29; Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga 
and Back (Hutchinson 1962) 28; Emily Jones, Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck and Ngaire Woods, Manoeuvring at the 
Margins: Constraints Faced by Small States in International Trade Negotiations (Commonwealth Secretariat 
2010) 15-24 
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that builds on itself. Newly appointed individuals did not have as effective a grasp of the 
history of Ramsar COPs, resulting in suggestions that had already been tackled a few cycles 
previously. During the interviews there was sympathy expressed for delegates parachuted 
into a position and without the time to review all of the regime’s previous work. However, it 
was felt this led to dependence upon the Ramsar Secretariat as well as longstanding members.  
Conversely, experience of Ramsar meetings offered significant advantages since, as one 
interviewee put it:  
so much is about trust, it is about building relations with other countries, them 
getting to know you, them knowing they can trust you and knowing they can work 
with you.
75
   
Such delegates could, therefore, constructively influence an MEA meeting given their 
knowledge of ‘the influencing bottlenecks’ and how they can best do their advocacy. Certain 
individuals with extensive experience of Ramsar were noted as being widely respected for 
their knowledge, which, in one case, led to an informal leadership role within the African 
group of States, as well as command of delegates’ attention when they wished to make a 
point.  
The interviewees offered their own views on the best way to acquire such expertise and 
experience. All those interviewed believed the best method was to learn on the job alongside 
more experienced colleagues. Good opportunities for such learning were smaller meetings 
held between Ramsar COPs or, for those that are members of the EU, when their government 
was holding the Presidency and therefore needed to staff bigger delegations to complete the 
additional tasks flowing from that responsibility.  
Some interviewees still saw some merit in formal training. For example, interviewees 
mentioned a past training workshop organised for African States due to attend a different 
MEA’s COP. The interviewees felt this had led to significant engagement in that plenary 
process from those African States, a renewed sense of collective action amongst all States 
attending, and ownership of decisions and initiatives adopted at the COP and advocated for 
by the African nations that had attended the workshop.
76
 In terms of Ramsar led teaching, one 
interviewee mentioned that Ramsar runs briefing sessions during COPs that enable 
individuals from the responsible working groups to explain significant proposals that they 
have developed. This provides all delegates with an opportunity to increase their knowledge 
and understanding of key items on the COP agenda.  
However, there was concern expressed about the future ability of the UK to field experienced 
delegates for Ramsar because UK delegates with experience and institutional knowledge 
were approaching retirement from service. It was felt a plan needed to be put in place to train 
successors through attending COPs or other regime meetings.  
                                                            
75
 This sentiment was repeated in interviews with NGOs, for example on working with experienced delegates: 
‘we know [them], [they] know us and we know [they] understand what we’re talking about. That doesn’t mean 
we wouldn’t talk to other people as well, including new faces, but they may be more constrained on what they 
can pick up and do…’ 
76
 Government and NGO interviewees highlighted these workshops; background information available at 
<http://www.unep-aewa.org/en/news/african-preparatory-negotiation-workshop-empowers-cms-and-aewa-
negotiators> accessed 4 March 2018. NGO interviews also highlighted similar training by World Wetland 
Network for civil society on effective COP engagement. 
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4.2 Pre-COP Preparation 
The UK as a State is a complex entity constituted by many parts. The UK has an executive 
branch divided into multiple ministries, a legislature, devolved administrations, and overseas 
territories. This generates the potential for great diversity of opinion on issues the COP is 
considering.
77
 Since wetland conservation depends upon successful integration across many 
sectors of public life and in such a complex institutional environment, the UK’s modalities 
for consultation as part of preparing to attend COP11 was anticipated to be a key topic for 
research.  
4.2.1 Desk-based findings 
Within DEFRA there are policy and legal divisions, and they in turn work closely with the 
Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) – the public body that advises the UK 
government on national and international nature conservation. Since divisions of DEFRA and 
the JNCC are in different locations, the individuals who are responsible for Ramsar 
implementation are spread between Bristol, London and Peterborough. Furthermore, wetland 
conservation requires the input and support of other bodies. For example, wetland 
conservation involves farming, infrastructure design, water resource management, tourism, 
and town planning. Policies implemented by other ministries and national NGOs, therefore, 
affect wetland conservation. Finally, the UK has devolved governments in Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales, as well as 14 British Overseas Territories.  
The risk this complexity creates is that vital information might be lost if DEFRA’s modalities 
for consultation are limited, and/or that ce tain groups, due to their power to engage with the 
process, capture the framing of the State’s position. Consequently, it might be thought that 
best practice for preparing the delegation for COP11 would be to engage with all of the noted 
branches and individuals as part of defining the national interest on a given issue.
78
 Indeed, 
the few external constraints upon internal modalities on preparation push for such an 
approach. Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration recommends that environmental issues 
are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens.
79
 Article 3(7) of the 1998 
Aarhus Convention
80
 requires the UK (as one of the contracting parties) to promote 
transparency and participation in international environmental decision-making processes. 
Greater detail was added to this in the Almaty Guidelines to the effect that ‘public 
participation generally contributes to the quality of decision-making on environmental 
matters in international forums by bringing different opinions and expertise to the process 
and increasing transparency and accountability’.
81
 Thus, participation should be as wide as 
possible, with particular attention given to: members of the public most affected by an 
environmental issue; public-interest organisations; and those contributing to, or able to 
alleviate, a problem.
82
 
                                                            
77
 Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard 2010) 112 
78
 Brunnée (n 52) 10-11 
79 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 
80
 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (1999) 38 ILM 517 
81
 Second Meeting of the Parties, Almaty, Kazakhstan, Decision II/4, [28] 
82 Id., [30] 
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However, this may be difficult in practice given the limited time available to consult the 
many and diverse groups linked to wetlands. Ramsar’s Rules of Procedure (an additional 
external constraints on modalities) create part of this time pressure. For example, the rules 
provide that the provisional agenda and dates for the plenary meeting will be circulated one 
year in advance.
83
 The documentation providing detailed information on agenda items is 
circulated at least three months before the opening of the COP.
84
 This means that there is 
limited time to consult on the proposals.  
Potentially, such constraints will be mitigated by the fact that significant developments take 
far longer to mature and will have been the subject of work in previous COPs or working 
groups. Nevertheless, there will remain practical barriers to full participation in consultation, 
and the danger arises for debate capture by a select few and that vital input will be missed.  
4.2.2 Findings from the interviews 
DEFRA’s aim is to provide each delegate with briefing documents that set out the UK’s 
position on each agenda item. These can be used as reference materials during the COP 
events. These briefing documents are produced in the light of the consultation process. 
As to the modalities on consultation, the data acquired through interviews divides between 
internal and external consultation. As to internal consultation, the DEFRA-convened team of 
delegates initiated the process for COP11. The delegates produced a first draft ‘position 
paper’ responding to the proposals, drawing upon their technical, legal and policy 
backgrounds. Not only did this enable them to set the tone for the UK’s position, but also 
ensured that proposals were assessed from the various professional perspectives of the 
delegates. A resolution viewed as benign from a policy perspective, but not from a legal 
viewpoint, would still get highlighted.  
Wider internal consultation followed, with the draft position paper circulated to the 
appropriate leads within DEFRA divisions and then around other government departments, 
devolved administrations and overseas territories. Because the UK had established a National 
Ramsar Steering Committee,
85
 the appropriate people to consult outside of DEFRA were 
readily apparent. DEFRA chairs this Committee, which includes individuals from 
government departments and devolved administrations.
86
 It meets annually, but otherwise 
operates in a virtual environment, and maintains regular communication via email and the 
internet. Therefore, face-to-face meetings are unnecessary as Ramsar information can be 
distributed electronically and views canvassed from around the country through a central co-
ordinator. Such a process is aimed at drawing out those departments with concerns on draft 
resolutions that may not otherwise be obvious to DEFRA. Sympathetic negotiating positions 
can then be formulated and included in the delegation’s briefing documents.  
One related issue is whether responses, and the negotiating positions based upon these 
responses, enjoy the support of suitably senior figures within the government departments. 
Given that DEFRA is not involved in discussions conducted in other departments, it has to 
                                                            
83
 Rules of Procedure (2005) Ramsar COP10 DOC.2 Rev.1, Rule 5 
84 Id., Rule 10 
85
 Establishing national committees has been encouraged under Ramsar Policy since 1993; Recommendation 5.7 
86
 Natura 2000 and Ramsar Steering Committee Terms of Reference, available 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130402151656/http://archive.defra.gov.uk/rural/protected/internat
ionally-designated-sites/n2kr-sc-tor-1011.pdf > accessed 4 March 2018 
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take it on faith that the input received has been ‘signed off’ by suitably authorised 
individuals. One interviewee also suggested that the final, collaboratively formulated, 
position would receive ministerial approval as ministers are provided with a shorter summary 
of the resolutions and proposed stances. Thus, the delegation sent to the Ramsar COP can 
attend as the authentic representative of the UK government.  
The modalities for preparing to attend COP11 also needed to capture the views of external 
groups. This meant UK civil society organisations and EU Member States. As to the former, 
interviews revealed that practice continues to evolve. Pre-COP11, modalities had initially 
utilised meetings between delegates and UK civil society organisations during Ramsar COPs, 
in order to discuss their respective positions and to resolve any disagreements. This, however, 
limited the range of consultation to those NGOs with the resources to send representatives to 
meetings – predominantly the RSPB, and the Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust – and thus 
produced a rather limited constituency. Around 10 years ago, this approach was 
supplemented by external consultation pursued through the Ramsar Forum. The Ramsar 
Forum, one respondent suggested, was effectively the UK’s national Ramsar committee. As 
such, it ought to have operated to feed these extra-government perspectives into national 
Ramsar positions. The Forum comprised representatives from the National Ramsar Steering 
Committee, plus civil society groups invited by that committee. Permanent invitees included 
15 NGOs, such as the Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust, UK Major Ports Group, and the 
National Farmers Union.
87
  
One interviewee observed that, owing to the previously described circumstances surrounding 
last minute changes to the delegate identities and the shorter timescale available for preparing 
for COP11, on this occasion the Forum could not be consulted in full. A targeted, lighter 
touch was all that was practicable. Thus, government positions and lines were conveyed to 
key organisations, such as the RSPB, and the Country Land and Business Association.  There 
then followed a two hour conference call with interested parties. One delegate intimated that, 
fortunately, this was sufficient since there seemed to be consistency between the government 
and NGO positions.  
The UK delegation interviews also elicited opinions on the changes that had been witnessed 
over time in the operation of the Forum. Some noted that there had been good engagement 
with it as UK sites for Ramsar listing were identified.
88
 However, once that process had 
concluded, civil society interest and attendance fell away. Another respondent, who offered a 
similar opinion on the levels of interest, was keen to highlight that this should not be 
misinterpreted. Wetlands remained of interest and concern for all stakeholders; it was simply 
that wetland conservation had evolved in the UK to a stage where functional discussion about 
conservation happened through other channels. Well-established channels of communication 
now existed between government and key players if a matter of national concern arose. 
Furthermore, ultimately the Ramsar COP had (for UK NGOs at least) become a forum for: 
feeding into larger wetland conservation issues at a global scale against which, 
perhaps, some of our UK issues are rather more minor… I think they’re [the 
                                                            
87
 Natura 2000 and Ramsar Forum Terms of Reference, available 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130402151656/http://archive.defra.gov.uk/rural/protected/internat
ionally-designated-sites/n2krf-tor-0810.pdf > accessed 4 March 2018 
88 See Section 2 on Ramsar listing. 
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NGOs] playing quite a nicely judged game of priorities that actually in a global 
context some of the issues that are important for the UK are actually probably 
best dealt with at home by trying to speak to the minister… rather than taking it 
to an international forum…  
In contrast, it was believed that in other States ‘where wetland conservation is in its infancy 
then having a national committee where you can get together all of the various players is 
crucially important’.   
Responses from NGO participants in the interviewing process were in line with those 
expressed by the UK delegates, but they also highlighted a cultural factor. Thus, the 
representatives of one NGO agreed that a national wetland issue ought not to be pursued 
through a Ramsar meeting unless it corresponded with issues in other countries, or that the 
wetland habitat in question was very rare and in imminent danger of being lost. They 
accepted that, for their organisation, the normal course of action for a nationally confined 
issue would begin with their own established lines of communication with government. The 
NGOs believed that outside the UK these channels of communication may not be available 
‘depending upon the country’s mentality and whether the Government is used to working 
with civil society’. This could lead to a need for greater campaigning in some countries where 
government/civil society interactions were lacking, in comparison to the UK where, at the 
time, ‘the Government is normally consultable if it does anything really stupid’. 
The above has focused upon national consultations. However, at the time of the research and 
writing the UK was a member of the EU. Even though the EU is not a contracting party to 
Ramsar, UK membership carries expectations to engage in consultations with other Member 
States within areas of EU competence. The EU has competence in all aspects covered by 
Ramsar except for setting Secretariat budgets and hosting arrangements. This expectation is 
encapsulated in the duty of sincere cooperation and the notion that Member States are acting 
as trustees of the Union interest in situations where the EU lacks the standing to exercise its 
competences.
89
 The interviews indicated that the modalities for EU consultation involved the 
lead being taken by the State then holding the EU Presidency. The interviewees surmised that 
pre-COP meetings in Brussels are predominantly concerned ith trying to find consistency in 
views on matters, and allocation of lead roles on issues once at the COP. The information 
acquired was then fed into the UK briefing documents produced in advance of the COP. 
4.3 Participation in Negotiations 
The moment when the various internal modalities of State Party delegations to Ramsar 
intersect in the collective production of decisions is during the actual COP. At this moment 
both the preparatory stages, and the modalities for participation at the plenary session, 
become intertwined. It is to the latter set of modalities – on participation – that this section 
finally turns. 
4.3.1 Desk-based findings 
                                                            
89
 Marise Cremona, ‘Member States as Trustees of the Union Interest: Participating in International Agreements 
on Behalf of the European Union’ in Anthony Arnull and others (eds.), Constitutional Order of States: Essays in 
EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart 2011) 435  
Page 17 of 26
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jel
Manuscripts submitted to Journal of Environmental Law
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
18 
 
The external constraints upon a State’s internal modalities for participation are derived from 
the founding treaty and the rules of procedure. The framework these set, within which the 
internal modalities operate, has a profound effect upon the parties’ expectations and power 
relationships.
90
 Most obviously, the rules defining the basis upon which decisions and 
resolutions will be adopted can have a particular influence upon the way States negotiate. 
Steinberg describes these decision-making rules as either majoritarian, weighted voting, or 
based upon consensus or unanimity; the last reflecting an approach of sovereign equality.
91
  
Ramsar provides that every effort must be made for decisions to be adopted with the 
consensus of the parties present at the COP; voting is only permitted as a last resort.
92
 This 
favouring of consensus decision-making raised interesting questions that the interviewing 
stage looked to explore. For example, does this lead to ambitious States holding out for 
significant concessions through which their support, or at least silence, can be bought?  
On a different tack, with non-plenary contact groups and discussions being widely utilised at 
COPs, how do delegations operate to ensure they have access to these discussions?
93
 In 
theory an uninvolved State may raise an objection in plenary following the outcomes of those 
contact group negotiations, resulting in the decision either being defeated or delayed until that 
State has been consulted. However, how would such action be regarded? 
A final area of interest concerns the general strategy adopted by the delegation with a view to 
influencing proceedings. Here there exist theories concerning different forms of leadership,
94
 
and more recognition that in epistemic communities the claim to knowledge is a source of 
influence.
95
  
4.3.2 Findings from the interviews 
The interviews generated data broadly relating to co-ordination, tactics, and the Ramsar 
consensus-based decision-making process. These will be covered in turn.  
The head of delegation leads basic coordination of the UK’s engagement. The head 
determines (i) which delegate should attend a given working group, (ii) when contact needs 
to be made with advisors back in the UK, and (iii) when a stance or position on an agenda 
item can confidently be advanced as being one to which the UK can commit. The interviews 
also revealed that, whilst having multiple delegates enabled attendance at parallel 
                                                            
90 Jacob Werksman, ‘Procedural and Institutional Aspects of the Emerging Climate Change Regime: Improvised 
Procedures and Impoverished Rules?’, workshop paper (23 November 1999) 
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cserge/Werksman.pdf> accessed 4 March 2018 
91
 Richard Steinberg, ‘In the Shadow of the Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO’ (2002) 56(2) International Organization 339, 339 
92
 Ramsar, Article 7(2) cf Ramsar Rules of Procedure (n 66) Rule 40. Whilst resort to voting is rare under 
Ramsar, there are notable exceptions within international environmental law, such as the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Fauna (3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243), where 
additions to and amendments of its appendices are regularly made following a vote. 
93
 See in the context of inexperienced NGOs being unfamiliar with ways to influence the COP process, Elisabeth 
Corell, ‘Non-State actor influence in the negotiations of the Convention to Combat Desertification’ (1999) 4(3) 
International Negotiation 197, 209-210 and 213 
94 See Robert Keohane, Political Influence in the General Assembly (International Conciliation No. 557) 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1966) 37-38; Joyeeta Gupta and Lasse Ringius, ‘The EU’s 
climate leadership: Reconciling ambition and reality’ (2001) 1(2) International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics 281, 282 
95 Corell (n 93) 199 
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discussions, the ensuing atomisation of the delegation necessitated significant efforts towards 
maintaining consistent and acceptable positions. UK co-ordination meetings began at 06:30 
in the morning, followed one hour later by EU co-ordination. COP proceedings would begin 
at 10:00 and would finish around 18:00, with regular ‘catch-up’ coordination meetings during 
the day and later in the evening. The facility for coordination with non-attending colleagues 
back in the UK remained possible due to modern communications, and one interviewee 
indicated that strategic pauses could be taken in Ramsar proceedings if the chair of a session 
felt it was beneficial to give delegates a chance to communicate with their home departments. 
Furthermore, the briefing document produced (as described in earlier sections) continued to 
evolve as part of this coordination process, and was a constant point of reference. 
Tactically, being part of the EU shaped the UK delegation’s approach. Thus ‘different 
countries took the lead on behalf of the other EU Member States on particular resolutions… it 
was a very effective way of… playing to the strengths within the EU family.’ Indeed, the UK 
led in some contact groups on behalf of the EU, supported by a small team made up of 
individuals from EU States. The EU’s collective strength also came to the fore when progress 
seemed to be being blocked by one State. The EU group was able to select a particular 
individual with key experience from within their ranks, and that individual was able to 
engage that State’s delegation directly to resolve the impasse. Moreover, in plenary, an 
intervention by one EU State from behind their national flag still indicated to the whole 
plenary that that State was effectively speaking for all 28 EU Member States.  
In addition to this, the interviews revealed some expected tactics. Experience within the UK 
delegation helped to identify key individuals within other State groupings. Given the respect 
accorded to the expressed opinions of these individuals within their coalitions, spending time 
explaining and seeking to persuade them of a given stance (if successful) was an efficient 
way of bringing a larger group of States towards a preferred position. In contrast, certain 
States were known to approach COPs with set positions and no intention to engage in 
negotiations and compromise. The tactic here was, nonetheless, to make efforts to approach 
them during informal occasions (such as coffee breaks) in order to try to find out if there was 
a way to secure a resolution that satisfied each other’s position. The UK regarded 
negotiations as needing to continue, in the last resort, without these parties, but in the hope 
that in plenary matters would ultimately proceed without objection. 
Having covered coordination and tactics, consensus decision-making was also explored in the 
interviews. The general observation was made that Ramsar did expended great effort in 
accommodating people so that decisions could be made via consensus. This promoted ‘buy-
in’, since participants would not feel they were being pressured into something they did not 
want to do. Consensus decision-making, however, also created tension as a small minority of 
States could dig in to ensure that the consensus accommodated their view. This could lead to 
decisions being watered down to the point of meaninglessness. Nevertheless, States that had 
missed a contact group, and who then looked to use the plenary and the need for consensus so 
as to have their say, were regarded as taking ‘a bit of a nuclear option’. The implication being 
that diplomatically, exploiting the need for consensus so as to overcome delegation numerical 
strength failings, was unacceptable. Having the capacity to send enough delegates who could 
attend key groups, therefore, remained important.
96
 
                                                            
96 Consensus decision-making is considered further later in this article. 
Page 19 of 26
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jel
Manuscripts submitted to Journal of Environmental Law
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
20 
 
The issue of the hosting of the Secretariat became entangled with consensus decision-making 
during COP11, and lay behind a number of responses connected to the process. Thirty States 
appeared to be committed to moving the Secretariat to UNEP for a variety of reasons.
97
 The 
majority, however, felt that this was unnecessary.
98
 It was thus clear that the two positions 
were a long way apart, but, given the extended period of uncertainty over the hosting 
arrangements, many were strongly in favour of concluding and closing the matter. The Chair 
of the COP therefore took the contentious decision of calling for a show of hands at the start 
of the plenary meeting to see if there would be enough support for change if consensus could 
not be reached and voting was required. The subsequent vote indicated there would not be the 
two-thirds majority at that time to approve a move from IUCN to UNEP.
99
 
Given that the UK was in favour of the status quo it is unsurprising that the interviewees 
generally supported this indicative vote, despite the general culture of consensus decision-
making. One observed that those against the indicative vote were generally those who wanted 
the Secretariat to move to UNEP, but were aware that they were unlikely to win if the matter 
was determined by a final vote. Another noted that the indicative vote did not hinder 
discussions and that many States felt the Chair could lead the discussion as it wished, and the 
show of hands would be a useful barometer to know where matters stood. By establishing 
that there were more than a third of States who would block a move to UNEP, the parties 
knew that move was going nowhere. Consensus negotiations could, therefore, be conducted 
on the basis that the Secretariat would be located with IUCN, and solutions could be pursued 
on that footing.  
 
5. The UK’s Internal Modalities For COP11 and the Likelihood of UK Compliance 
In Section 3 it was proposed that according to theory decisions at COP11 were more likely to 
influence UK behaviour if they were regarded as rationally persuasive and/or the issuing 
authority normatively legitimate. Section 4 then established in detail the internal modalities 
for the UK in connection with their engagement with the COP11 process and the decisions 
taken at that session. In this section it is necessary to step back from the detail to take a 
broader perspective through the lenses of normative legitimacy (both the input and output 
forms of legitimacy detailed in Section 3) and rational persuasion. These lenses draw out 
from the data and bring to the foreground those modalities that these theories suggest 
might
100
 impact upon the persuasiveness of the decision from the perspective of engendering 
suitable UK action in response.  
5.1 Legitimacy 
                                                            
97
 Such as the need to improve synergies with other MEAs, and a perceived increase in the political and 
international visibility of Ramsar; Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the 11th Conference of the Parties to 
the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (IISD 2012), 4 <http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb1739e.pdf> accessed 
4 March 2018 
98
 Not least because the political visibility issue could easily be resolved by including a high-level ministerial 
segment; id., 15 
99
 Id., 4. The two-thirds majority is required by Article 8(1). 
100
 The paper examines how practice might lead to more persuasive decisions since the empirical research was 
designed to establish the content of the UK’s internal modalities, and not the degree to which the UK did 
comply with the decisions reached. 
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It will be recalled that in the theories on normative legitimacy of authorities
101
 (normative 
being a reference to the qualities of the ruler) a distinction exists between input and output 
legitimacy. As was explained in Part 3.2.2, for output legitimacy (referring to the results of 
issuing directions), (a) access to experts, and (b) due delegation to such individuals in order 
to generate rational decisions insulated from political values, is known to be crucial.
102
 For 
input legitimacy (standards surrounding the process of issuing directions) it was also 
established in Part 3.2.2 that inter alia (1) transparency, (2) stable rules and traditions, (3) 
public participation, (4) due deliberation, and (5) democratic decision-making, are vital.
103
 In 
the following sections, the data will be used to highlight how these factors in output and input 
legitimacy might be being secured. 
The crucial authorities in this study are obviously Ramsar (and its COP), and the lead-
implementing agency within the UK (DEFRA). DEFRA, for instance, must be viewed as 
normatively legitimate amongst the key actors it will seek to influence as it implements 
Ramsar decisions. 
5.1.1 Input legitimacy 
Focusing first upon DEFRA’s internal modalities
104
 as revealed by the research, its approach 
to consultation could be significant for delivering input legitimacy via a transparent, 
participatory process.  The National Ramsar Steering Committee secures participation in 
formulating a State position for cross-government officials and devolved governments. 
Further, previous meetings of the Ramsar Forum ought to have promoted Government 
transparency amongst civil society and academics, and to have given NGOs a participatory 
role as well. However, these were not employed for COP11 and, whilst the situation dictated 
such temporary measures, informal consultation via conference calls with selected wetland 
NGOs risked undue influence and private lobbying from a closed group, thus potentially 
undermining a sense of a transparent participatory process.
105
 That said, at least there was 
some consultation with non-governmental bodies. Nevertheless, repetition of this form of 
consultation needs to be avoided.  
Thus, with the Forum noted to be in decline, it is encouraging to note that, since conducting 
the interviews, a new initiative has been pursued in which DEFRA has compiled an email 
circulation list of stakeholders and other interested parties in biodiversity issues, all of whom 
are invited to various consultation meetings for the biodiversity conventions. In March 2015 
these parties were invited to Barnes Wetland Centre to discuss the agenda items for Ramsar 
COP12. The new mechanism seems open to anyone with an interest and it appears easy to 
approach DEFRA to become a member of this circulation list. This was something that was 
not so easy for the Ramsar Forum, which operated on an invite basis and was in practice 
limited to the groups listed in its Terms of Reference.
106
 If successful this body could prove to 
                                                            
101 As opposed to normative legitimacy of a legal system; see Part 3.2. 
102
 See also Esty (n 61) 1517 
103
 See also Bodansky (n 44) 329-332 
104
 As a short aside, it is worth noting that DEFRA’s own normative input legitimacy receives a significant boost 
by being nested within a democratic political system; Esty (n 61) 1507 and 1515 
105
 Elizabeth Kirk, ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in Treaty Regimes for the Protection of Marine Biodiversity’ 
in Michael Bowman, Peter Davies and Edward Goodwin (eds), Research Handbook on Biodiversity and Law 
(Edward Elgar 2016) 95, 97 
106 (n 87) 
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be an excellent vehicle for delivering transparency and wider participation, reinforcing the 
deliberative and procedural aspects of input legitimacy of the Ramsar COP process, as well 
as the authority of DEFRA to implement decisions. 
Ramsar’s COP process can also be assessed through an input legitimacy optic. In Part 4, the 
dominance of consensus decision-making was highlighted. Such forms of decision-making 
should secure due deliberation by ensuring an equal voice for all participants, and thus 
enhance input legitimacy. However, in recent years, controversies have occurred about the 
meaning of consensus and consensus-decision making, particularly where a small minority of 
States have objected to a course of action.
107
 As the research presented herein reveals, 
Ramsar is not immune to controversy surrounding its rules for adopting decisions, as 
exemplified in the ‘show of hands’ initiative at COP11 concerning Secretariat hosting. This 
event is concerning given it threatens many of the aspects of input legitimacy; suggesting the 
regime does not operate according to transparent predictable and stable administrative rules 
nor do its processes engage all interested parties. If input legitimacy is undermined, so too is 
one of the forces driving decision influence. 
5.1.2 Output legitimacy 
DEFRA’s deliberate selection of delegates with suitable experience and expertise could also 
connect to output legitimacy. Experienced delegates encourage adoption of positions and 
collective agreement of decisions that are properly rooted in science, are rational, insulated 
from politics, and account for known challenges for wetland conservation thereby yielding 
better outcomes.
108
  
5.2 Rational Persuasion 
It is worth recalling that rational persuasion is when an actor regards a direction as 
convincing in some way. This may be because it is interpreted as being in the interest of a 
State or the individual whose acts count as those of the State. Alternatively, it may be 
convincing according to science, the merits of a well-reasoned judgment, or a sense of 
justice. Because of this, three crucial stages need to be considered: (i) identifying key actors 
who need to be rationally persuaded; (ii) identifying the various grounds upon which a 
proposal might then be viewed as rationally determined by those actors; and (iii) having 
identified which grounds are likely to rationally persuade key actors, ensuring that the 
decision issued by the COP reflects them effectively.  
Taking each in turn, as to (i) classically MEAs establish obligations and issue directions that 
depend upon national implementation to have effect. Therefore, the obvious group that needs 
to be rationally persuaded by a decision is the lead government agency for Ramsar. In the UK 
this meant DEFRA (and more immediately, the delegates representing DEFRA). Post-
COP11, DEFRA was relied upon to begin the process of adjusting national approaches and 
regulation in accordance with the resolutions.  
                                                            
107
 The best example of this in international environmental law of recent years comes from the climate change 
regime; see for an excellent critique Dapo Akande, ‘What is the meaning of “consensus” in international 
decision making?’ EJIL: Talk! (8 April 2013) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/negotiations-on-arms-trade-treaty-fail-to-
adopt-treaty-by-consensus-what-is-the-meaning-of-consensus-in-international-decision-making/> accessed 4 
March 2018; see also Antto Vihma, ‘Climate of Consensus: Managing Decision Making in the UN Climate 
Change Negotiations’ (2015) 24(1) RECIEL 58 
108 Esty (n 61) 1517 
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However, as indicated earlier, the management of wetlands cuts across multiple aspects of 
national policy, and in seeking to make adjustments DEFRA is itself reliant upon the 
cooperation of other government departments and devolved administrations to approve 
regulations and enforce them. According to the theory, for them to adjust their behaviour, 
these actors must ideally also be rationally persuaded by DEFRA’s instructions. 
The data collected relating to the modalities on consultation highlights that the introduction 
of the National Ramsar Steering Committee has helped to identify in advance the relevant 
actors across central and devolved governments. In contrast the temporary measures used in 
the run up to COP11 may not have captured all of the non-governmental actors. In future the 
new biodiversity liaison initiative (mentioned in Section 5.1) offers a mechanism for actors to 
identify themselves with, and declare an interest to, DEFRA. This is supplemented by the 
experience of DEFRA staff which helps to prioritise actors within government and key NGOs 
for consultation. 
As to (ii), having contacted a number of appropriate actors in the run-up to COP11, DEFRA 
employed modalities that should have released and collated a great volume of information 
defining the interests of wetland stakeholders. In this regard, the data once again indicated the 
importance of experience. For instance, freedom was given to individuals to produce the first 
draft responses to the proposed COP11 agenda items. In this process, one respondent 
described how their own knowledge of previous standing committee work, as well as past 
objectives and ‘red lines’, gave a good indication of the likely discussions and concerns at the 
COP. This then fed into producing practicable proposals for circulation to national actors.  
Thereafter, recourse to consultation with the National Ramsar Steering Committee and key 
NGO actors, offered the potential for the DEFRA delegation to have an excellent 
understanding of the form of outcome that was likely to appeal to all sectorial interests. 
Interestingly, the data indicated that much of that consultation was facilitated by electronic 
communications, and this practice ought to be considered by other States as a cost effective 
way to capture viewpoints. However, as a warning, that same mode has costs linked to the 
fact that communication is far more effective when parties are physically present with each 
other; otherwise body language might be missed, or the intensity of engagement 
diminished.
109
 It seems, however, that having reasonable awareness of a large range of actors’ 
concerns should be preferable to awareness of fewer interests at a more nuanced level.  
Turning to (iii) and the participation phase of internal modalities, once again the data 
consistently indicated that delegate experience is key to translating the identified bases of 
rational decisions into the products of COPs. The modalities for the UK delegation on 
delegate selection indicated a valuing of quality of delegates (particularly linked to 
experience of Ramsar meetings) over quantity. Such experience generated influence within 
the regime, as well as securing greater effectiveness in terms of disseminating State positions 
at the plenary session – indeed, this was confirmed in the data with respect to modalities for 
participation at the COP where experience enhanced the ability to identify key delegates in 
whom it was worth investing time with a view to securing the UK’s preferred positions.  
                                                            
109
 The diminished quality of communication in the absence of physical interaction is a recognized challenge for 
online dispute resolution; Joseph Goodman, ‘The Pros and Cons of Online Dispute Resolution: An Assessment 
of Cyber-Mediation Websites’ (2003) 4 Duke Law and Technology Review 1, 10-13 
Page 23 of 26
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jel
Manuscripts submitted to Journal of Environmental Law
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
24 
 
Securing such experience required a commitment to staff retention and stability (at least to 
the extent of one delegate having attended a series of previous plenary sessions), and 
investment in facilitating practical training derived from attending sessions (not necessarily 
the plenary, but preferably with a mentor) rather than from classroom-based instruction. 
Pausing to look beyond the UK’s internal modalities to Ramsar contracting parties more 
generally, if the theory is correct then the recommendations for securing rationally persuasive 
decisions are that States ought to plan for, and be supported in developing, delegates with 
experience of international environmental negotiations, and ideally specifically for Ramsar. 
Although there was some support expressed by the UK delegates for international training 
workshops to this end, the preferred way to do this was suggested to be shadowing colleagues 
before being left alone to represent a State. It might, however, prove difficult for States with 
limited budgets to afford sending multiple personnel to a meeting. As a result, regime funds 
or international aid would need to be released to support such measures, rather than merely 
attendance by a single delegate. The potential positive impact upon decision influence would 
more than justify this. 
Alternatively, delegates need to have easy access to others who can fill gaps in knowledge 
and experience. This might be through engaging NGO experts to join delegations, or 
accepting assistance from other States in the form of their nationals joining delegations. 
These solutions, though, pose problems as NGOs ultimately answer to different 
constituencies compared to the many democratically elected States, whilst there may be 
concerns about the independence of other nationals joining delegations. Less problematical is 
making use of negotiating blocs, like that operated by the EU Member States, or through 
proper support from advisors back in the State’s national offices. The justification is obvious: 
suitably experienced and supported delegates are believed to be better able to assess in 
advance, and challenge during COP negotiations, the legal, diplomatic and scientific merits 
of a decision. An adequately staffed and supported delegation with experience in multi-lateral 
negotiations is also best equipped to insert the State’s own rationally persuasive stance into 
the final product.  
The data suggested particular strengths for the UK in this regard; regime, policy, legal, 
scientific, vertical and horizontal experience was all present within the delegation to COP11. 
There was also no suggestion that the UK had insufficient numbers to attend important 
contact groups at the COP. This may not be the case for all countries participating in Ramsar 
COPs, but the pursuit of rationally persuasive decisions re-emphasises how important 
succession planning might be for future UK engagement with Ramsar. The interviews, 
however, revealed concerns about succession planning, as well as cutbacks in departmental 
budgets that again hinted at increasing challenges in this regard. 
Further, coalitions were significant for the UK delegation in the context of COP11. Acting as 
a coalition clearly offered the UK the chance to have its positions represented and amplified 
at the COP. Different States enjoyed different diplomatic relationships, and this could be used 
to reach further than a State acting on its own. The coalition also bolstered the effective size 
of the delegation. However, this coalition was founded upon membership of the EU, and, as 
mentioned already, following ‘Brexit’ this is not projected as being automatically available in 
the future. This possible loss of collective bargaining power, and potential impact upon the 
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UK’s internal modalities presents itself as a key area of future concern for decisions that 
might be rationally persuasive within the UK. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has explained that decisions taken by the COP to Ramsar, in common with many 
other MEAs, are crucial for the effective operation of the regime. These decisions, therefore, 
need to influence the behaviour of the States Parties to Ramsar. Internal modalities for the 
preparation of delegations, and the participation of those delegations at COPs, can be linked 
to the characteristics of the decision and decision-making process that according to theory 
affect the likelihood of those crucial decisions influencing State behaviour. This is because 
the normative legitimacy of the decision-making process, and the degree to which a decision 
is rationally persuasive to a State, might be enhanced or undermined by decisions made by a 
State when implementing its internal modalities surrounding delegations to the Ramsar COP. 
This position was illustrated by recourse to a grounded case study on the UK delegation to 
COP11.  
This analysis of the data acquired on the UK government’s internal modalities for delegate 
preparation and participation at COP11 suggests that, if we accept Bodansky’s assessment of 
the literature on decision influence as being accurate, the UK had adopted practices that 
enhance the likelihood that decisions adopted at that session (and indeed future COPs if 
replicated) will be viewed as being legitimate and rationally persuasive by the UK. In theory 
this should, in turn, increase the chances of those decisions having the desired impact upon 
the UK’s actions and thus the wise use and conservation of wetland areas. Naturally, it has 
only been possible to draw theoretical conclusions (thus talk in terms of likelihood) since the 
empirical research was designed to establish the content of the UK’s internal modalities, and 
not the degree to which the UK did comply with the decisions reached. 
The case study has also served to provide examples of practice that other States may feel 
would be practicable and represent a desirable development for themselves. In turn, if the 
theory proposed in this paper is correct, many of these adjustments could ultimately enhance 
the persuasiveness of COP decisions within those States. Delegate experience and numerical 
strength, wide and transparent consultation, use of modern communication, delegation 
briefing papers that evolve, and resort to negotiation blocs, have all been highlighted as of 
potential importance, and this could be used to inform international aid and capacity building 
initiatives. 
However, risks within the UK’s internal modalities were also identified. Some have already 
been addressed, such as reforms for consulting externally with NGO’s and other private 
stakeholders. Nevertheless, whilst numerical strength, substantive expertise and forensic 
experience had all been secured across the appointment of delegates and used to great effect 
in the lead-up to, and at, the COP, concerns became evident about future capacity to have 
access to these qualities. This was because of limited funding and succession planning, as 
well as the imminent departure of the UK from the EU. When linked to the theory advanced 
in this paper concerning persuasiveness of decisions, this lends weight to calls for urgent 
action to retain and transfer institutional knowledge and experience. 
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Diagram 1 – Size and Experience of UK Delegations to Ramsar COPs 1980-2015
1
 
 
                                                             
1
 The host nation is excluded from average calculations since the records reveal exceptional numbers of 
delegates that are out of the ordinary for the host State’s usual practice, thus skewing the average; for 
greater detail see [removed for anonymity] id., 77 
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